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Abstract: The rhetoric of disgust is common in moral discourse and political 
propaganda. Some believe it’s pernicious, for it convinces without evidence.  But 
scientific research now suggests that disgust is typically an effect, not a cause, of moral 
judgment. At best the emotion on its own only sometimes slightly amplifies a moral belief 
one already has. Appeals to disgust are thus dialectically unhelpful in discourse that seeks 
to convince. When opponents of abortion use repulsive images to make their case, they 
convince few, even if they rally their base. When champions of animal rights show 
graphic depictions of the torturous conditions of animals in factory farms, they convince 
only those previously ignorant of the severity of such conditions. Ultimately, disgust may 
be less pernicious than it is useless.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Disgust is a powerful and visceral emotion, so it’s no wonder that it enters moral and 
political discourse. Leon Kass (1997), for instance, famously appeals to the “wisdom of 
repugnance” to motivate us to resist biotechnologies, such as human cloning. Kass 
arguably had a profound impact on federal policy in the United States, given his role as 
chair of George W. Bush’s President’s Council on Bioethics. Perhaps most notably the 
Bush administration ushered in a ban on federal funding of research using new embryonic 
stem cell lines, which arguably hindered medical advancement.  
 More recently, the rhetoric of disgust entered media outlets around America when 
a video surfaced in 2015 regarding Planned Parenthood, a non-profit organization 
specializing in sexual and reproductive health services. The Center for Medical Progress, 
an anti-abortion group, secretly filmed a conversation over lunch with a physician from 
Planned Parenthood, Dr. Deborah Nucatola. Over lunch, Dr. Nucatola discusses the 
demand for and costs of body parts from fetuses aborted at Planned Parenthood clinics. 
(Selling such parts is legal in the U.S. so long as it’s not done for a profit.) Conservative 
commentator, Paul Greenberg (2015), railed against the “gruesome” video in an opinion 
piece published in various newspapers, primarily in Southern states. He appealed to 
reactions of “repugnance” and celebrated the way the video made this vivid: “Those of 
us who have long opposed abortion (except perhaps in the clearest, life-threatening cases) 
stand accused of using these videos to inflame public opinion against it. It’s an accusation 
to which I plead guilty.” 
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Both liberals and conservatives appeal to the idiom of disgust. For conservative 
philosopher, John Kekes (1998), heeding our reactions of moral repugnance helps 
societies maintain social order by marking “the kind of violation that threatens civilized 
life” (105). Similarly, William Ian Miller (1997), writes that disgust “signals seriousness, 
commitment, indisputability, presentness, and reality” (180), applying chiefly to cruelty, 
betrayal, hypocrisy, and fawning (185-6). Miller thus deems disgust “above all… a moral 
and social sentiment” (2). Dan Kahan (1999) defends the progressive appropriation of 
disgust, as when liberals describe racism, sexism, and homophobia as repulsive (see also 
Midgley 2000; Kumar 2017). Kahan claims that disgust has “powerful rhetorical capital” 
(63), making it an “indispensable member of our moral vocabulary” (64). Some scientists 
appear to agree, arguing that the rhetoric of disgust can affect causes that aren’t 
distinctively conservative, such as environmental conservation, opposition to genetically 
modified foods, and anti-vaccination movements (Rottman et al. 2015; Clifford & 
Wendell 2015). 
 Those who appeal to disgust in their arguments and rhetoric do not target a narrow 
audience. Kass (1997), for example, speaks of “the widespread repugnances of 
humankind” (21), which arise “from the man or woman in the street and from the 
intellectuals, from believers and atheists, from humanists and scientists” (19). Likewise, 
what Kekes (1998) calls “moral disgust” is the emotional response to actions that “just 
about everybody in contemporary Western societies would find disgusting” (102); it’s 
“the normal reaction” whose “absence requires further explanation” (103). 
 Elsewhere I have contended that arguments from repugnance fail by 
unwarrantedly assuming that disgust substantially influences moral judgment in the first 
place (May 2016). Still, one might argue that rhetorical appeals to disgust in discourse 
and propaganda effectively convince despite being poor arguments. Here I aim to show 
that rhetorical appeals are substantially limited. Our best scientific evidence suggests that 
the feeling of disgust alone hardly influences moral judgment and is largely an effect of 
an existing moral judgment. So the emotion isn’t fit for convincing opponents or even 
agnostics. Getting one’s audience disgusted works best when it draws their attention to 
facts of which they were previously unaware. But the tactic is more likely to just entrench 
already existing moral judgments, rally one’s existing allies, or even push people away 
from one’s cause. 
 Other ethicists have likewise doubted that appeals to disgust are valuable (e.g. 
Nussbaum 2004; Kelly 2011). However, such critiques grant the dubious assumption that 
the emotion all by itself substantially influences moral judgment. The problem with the 
rhetoric of disgust is more fundamental. Our best scientific account of disgust’s relation 
to moral judgment suggests that it’s of limited use in moral and political discourse. 
 
2. Disgust Hardly Influences Moral Judgment 
 
A main goal of argument and rhetoric is to change people’s minds. If appeals to disgust 
are to achieve this goal, then the emotion should substantially influence moral judgment. 
Fortunately, scientific research on disgust is booming (Haidt 2003)—indeed, we might 
dub this the “decade of disgust.”  
Some studies merely demonstrate correlations between moral judgment and 
disgust, particularly among certain groups. Political conservatives, for example, are more 
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easily disgusted than liberals, and this predicts real differences in behavior, such as voting 
choices in presidential elections, even when controlling for variation in personality traits. 
Such findings have been reproduced in an enormous sample and with participants from 
over 100 countries (Inbar et al. 2012). Neuroscientists have even been able to significantly 
predict whether someone is conservative simply by detecting heightened activity in a 
network of brain areas when the individual is viewing certain disgusting images, such as 
a mutilated body, which have nothing to do with politics (Ahn et al. 2014). Now, 
conservatives and liberals certainly hold different moral opinions about many subjects, 
so perhaps their differences in disgust-sensitivity are part of the cause. While suggestive, 
these data do only support correlations; let’s focus on direct evidence of a causal 
connection.  
Over a dozen published experiments do seem to show that merely feeling 
unrelated or incidental disgust near the time of a moral judgment can make it substantially 
harsher or more negative. There are numerous proponents of such findings. Daniel Kelly 
(2011), for example, says that disgust is “powerful” (124), capable of “dramatic effects” 
on our moral opinions (130). Jesse Prinz even goes so far as to conclude that “we can 
form the belief that something is morally wrong by simply having a negative emotion 
directed towards it” (Prinz 2006: 31). Alexandra Plakias (2013) similarly contends that 
“disgust is strongly implicated in moral judgment” (261) and that this is “well-
established” (264) by the science. Such proclamations are not limited to philosophers 
either. Hanah Chapman and Adam Anderson (2013) recently write that the empirical 
studies “converge to support the notion that disgust does play an important role in 
morality” (322), including “an important modulatory influence on moral judgments” 
(313).  
Let’s consider the evidence. 
 
2.1 Inducing Disgust  
 
Some “moral dumbfounding” studies suggest that our moral beliefs are primarily driven 
by emotions, such as disgust, while conscious reasoning is just rationalization after the 
fact (e.g. Haidt et al. 1993). However, the studies don’t clearly measure disgust in 
particular, let alone manipulate it (May 2016, 46). Moreover, emotions needn’t be 
implicated simply because people struggled to articulate the reasons for their positions. 
Moral judgment, much like many other kinds of judgment, can be quick and automatic 
while nonetheless resulting from unconscious reasoning from sophisticated principles 
(Dwyer 2009; May 2018). 
The experiments to consider are those that manipulate disgust and measure moral 
opinions about hypothetical scenarios. This methodology is especially significant, since 
we can isolate the power of this emotion all by itself by inducing disgust that is irrelevant 
or incidental to the action being evaluated. After all, we’re interested in whether getting 
one’s audience to feel queasy can alone influence the moral evaluation of an action, 
beyond merely correlating such a reaction with something else that does the real work, 
such as drawing attention to information about the action’s consequences or the actor’s 
intent.  
Experimenters have induced disgust in various ways. Some have used hypnosis 
to make participants feel a flash of disgust upon reading a certain word (Wheatley & 
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Haidt 2005). Others rely on a foul smell in the air, a film clip involving an unflushed 
toilet, or recalling a disgusting experience (Schnall et al. 2008). Still others have had 
participants directly ingest a bitter liquid (Eskine et al. 2011) or listen to the sound of a 
man vomiting (Seidel & Prinz 2013). In these and some other studies, disgust on average 
tended to make moral judgments harsher. 
Other experiments have manipulated what may seem to be disgust’s opposite: 
feelings of purity or cleanliness. The results are more varied, however. Participants made 
to feel more clean—e.g. by using hand sanitizer or washing their hands—sometimes 
register moral judgments that are less harsh but sometimes more (for review, see Tobia 
2015). 
 At any rate, the disgust experiments provide the more direct test. Yet they do not 
establish that this emotion substantially influences moral judgment, for several reasons 
(see May 2014). First, the experimenters often only find an effect of disgust among some 
subset of participants, such as those who are highly hypnotizable or especially attuned to 
changes in their bodily states. Second, such effects are scarce, as they’re found among 
only a minority of the hypothetical scenarios tested. Third, the differences in responses 
between the control and manipulation groups are relatively small (a point briefly raised 
by others, notably Mallon & Nichols 2010, 317–8; Pizarro et al. 2011). By and large, 
responses slightly shift on the same side of a fine-grained scale. This indicates at best a 
slight change in the severity, but not the valence (or polarity), of the judgment. For 
example, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) used a 100-point scale with “0” labeled “not at all 
morally wrong” and “100” labeled “extremely morally wrong.” In one vignette involving 
bribery, the average morality rating of the control group was 78.73 while the disgust 
group’s was 91.28. This difference is statistically significant, but that roughly means only 
that it was not likely due to chance; we have reason to reject the null hypothesis that there 
really is no difference in the general population. Importantly, though, statistical 
significance alone does not mean that a difference, or an effect, is substantial in the 
ordinary sense. 
 These problems are not mere quibbles about a few early studies. There is now 
ample evidence that the effect of moral judgment on disgust is far from robust. Numerous 
attempts to replicate such findings have failed. And a recent meta-analysis (Landy & 
Goodwin 2015) of the effect sizes from 50 studies confirms that disgust at best only 
slightly amplifies moral judgments (d = 0.11), ranking “small” on a standard metric of 
effect sizes. Moreover, the effect size disappears (d = -0.01) among unpublished studies, 
suggesting a publication bias in favor of positive results. It is no surprise, then, that there 
are consistent limitations even among the studies that do report (scarce) effects, as 
opposed to replication failures. Thus, insofar as disgust alone influences moral judgment 
at all, we have evidence only that it can make some existing judgments slightly harsher, 
not change moral opinions. 
Disgust’s limits may be even more severe. There is some evidence that the (slight) 
effect on moral judgment disappears in participants who can more finely distinguish their 
own emotions (Cameron, Payne, & Doris 2013). Thus, the effect might merely be due to 
an unconscious misattribution of the source of one’s disgust (May 2018). The studies on 
incidental disgust, then, may not illuminate anything about the ordinary processes leading 
to forming moral beliefs. The emotion’s role at best may be more akin to the slight 
influence that fatigue can have on our moral beliefs. Even if being mentally tired can 
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make one’s moral judgments slightly harsher, we wouldn’t expect lawyers, politicians, 
philosophers, and pastors to try to make their audiences sleepy. To use some language 
common in cognitive science, disgust may be a mere performance error that does not 
shed light on moral competence or the psychological mechanisms that guide ordinary 
moral judgment (May 2016). There is more to say about how disgust could sometimes 
amplify moral judgment if it is typically a mere consequence, but I leave those details for 
another occasion (see May 2018). The upshot is that, while rhetorical appeals to disgust 
may not be utterly worthless, their utility is at best greatly limited. 
Now, perhaps the disgust experiments aren’t best suited for revealing the power 
of this emotion to substantially influence moral judgment. Most of the studies measure 
moral attitudes toward issues that aren’t particularly controversial and aren’t violations 
of the purity of one’s body or mind. For example, researchers have asked disgusted 
participants about the morality of acts of lying, bribery, littering, and stealing. Moreover, 
when researchers do study moral judgments having to do with purity norms, they ask 
about relatively uncontroversial topics, such as incest, cannibalism, and eating one’s pet 
dog. Perhaps incidental disgust’s ability to influence moral cognition is more apparent or 
powerful for controversial topics that specifically deal with purity violations. 
A recent study, however, suggests otherwise. Clifford and Wendell (2015) 
measured attitudes toward some politically controversial topics in the purity domain, such 
as support for: genetically modified and organic foods, vaccinations, government 
regulation of unhealthy foods (e.g. a soda tax), smoking bans, and legalizing recreational 
drugs. Incidental disgust was manipulated and participants’ general sensitivity to the 
emotion was assessed in order to see if either variable had an effect on political attitudes 
toward the controversial health issues. Clifford and Wendell found only that disgust 
sensitivity predicted most of the political attitudes measured. This finding is of course 
consistent with the hypothesis that disgust is an effect, not a cause, of negative attitudes 
toward such perceived threats to purity norms. This finding is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that disgust influences such attitudes only by making relevant thoughts about 
the topic more salient. For example, disgust-sensitive people may be more inclined to feel 
disgust toward genetically modified foods but also therein be more inclined to see such 
foods as harmful to the body. In that case, it may be thoughts about harm, not the mere 
feeling of disgust, that’s responsible for the change in attitude. Moreover, tellingly, the 
researchers found hardly any evidence in support of the causal claim that the feeling of 
disgust alone helps to cause such attitudes independently of relevant thoughts. When 
incidental disgust was manipulated, it produced a statistically significant difference only 
in attitudes toward the regulation of junk food (e.g. through taxes, bans, or mandatory 
calorie information). And this lone effect “fell short of statistical significance” originally, 
only becoming significant after “controlling for covariates” (168) that are unidentified.  
 
2.2 Disgust Follows Moral Judgments 
 
No doubt emotions can sometimes influence moral cognition, as affect in general 
sometimes provides us with information (Schwarz & Clore 1983; Pizarro 2000). 
However, we’ve seen that empirical evidence is converging on the idea that the feeling 
of disgust alone is not a substantial cause (or sustainer) of a sizeable class of moral beliefs. 
Page 6 of 16	
It gets worse, for there is some evidence from experimental studies that repugnance is 
typically an effect of moral judgment, not a cause.  
Of course, some reactions of revulsion are not connected to moral beliefs at all. 
Eating an insect might disgust you but it needn’t have any relation to your moral beliefs, 
either as an effect or as a cause. However, when there is a connection between a moral 
belief and repugnance, the emotion may be elicited by the belief, not the other way 
around. This issue has been raised by others (e.g. Huebner et al. 2009; Pizarro et al. 2011; 
May 2016), but is there specific evidence to support it? 
The most popular experiments on disgust and moral judgment have not precisely 
measured temporal ordering. Some, however, have attempted to do precisely that using 
an electroencephalogram to track the timing of different mental processes (Yang et al. 
2013; Yang et al. 2014). In short, the researchers found evidence that participants process 
the information that would trigger disgust after making the moral judgment. Two EEG 
studies from a single lab certainly do not settle the matter. However, we can combine this 
evidence with some other empirical studies on “moralization,” which likewise 
demonstrates how disgust follows negative moral judgments.  
Consider changes in reactions of disgust following a change in specific moral 
beliefs. A natural example concerns omnivores who become vegetarians and who are 
eventually disgusted by meat. We can begin by considering some anecdotes. A topic on 
the Internet forum Reddit.com (2014) concerns exactly this issue. The original poster 
writes:  
I remember eating meat and being happy with it but I’ve been a vegetarian for 
over 10 years now. I can’t remember when this started but I am utterly disgusted 
by meat. Can’t stand the smell or look or thought of meat. 
Other commenters on the post report similar changes in sentiment over time. 
Of course, not every vegetarian becomes repulsed by meat, perhaps for various 
reasons. Some may be vegetarian merely for health, not moral, reasons. For those who 
have moral reasons, their confidence in them may be weaker than others’. Finally, the 
desire for meat may be too entrenched in some, given their personal preferences or length 
of time as a meat-eater.  
However, there is some empirical evidence that “moral vegetarians” are more 
disgusted by meat than those who are vegetarians for the health benefits (Rozin et al. 
1997). And further research suggests that this result is not simply due to moral vegetarians 
already being more disgust-sensitive (Fessler et al. 2003). Thus, it seems we can take the 
Redditors’ reports at face value: the ethical beliefs of many moral vegetarians eventually 
elicit disgust as a consequence. The emotional response is related to the moral judgment 
by following it. 
This general phenomenon, which Paul Rozin has called moralization, is not 
restricted to vegetarianism either. Few people are vegetarians, let alone for moral reasons, 
but many more are now disgusted by cigarette smoke. Just in the past 50 years attitudes 
toward smoking tobacco have radically changed. Interestingly, there is some evidence 
that people in the United States have become more disgusted by cigarettes and other 
tobacco products after forming the belief that it’s a morally questionable habit and 
industry to support (Rozin & Singh 1999). Such research confirms a common 
phenomenon in ordinary experience about a variety of actions: disgust commonly follows 
one’s moral judgments. 
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3. Changing Minds? 
 
Our best scientific evidence thus suggests that disgust alone is typically a result of 
existing moral judgments, while any influence in the other direction is generally 
minuscule. Even if disgust can be a fitting emotion toward foul acts (Kumar 2017), it’s 
not an integral input to moral cognition. 
Feelings of repugnance can certainly influence moral judgment if they inform one 
of morally relevant information, such as the severity of a harm. Suppose, for example, 
that I read in the newspaper about a gruesome murder that a young child unfortunately 
witnessed. Disgust may help draw my attention to how severely this traumatized the child. 
Someone devoid of disgust may not fully appreciate exactly how it would affect an 
ordinary person to see, say, another human disemboweled. But this doesn’t accord disgust 
a substantial role in the application of the concept of moral wrongness. Instead, revulsion 
can aid in apprehending morally relevant facts in cases that happen to involve grisly 
details that are liable to gross one out.  
To further illustrate, imagine that a disgruntled employee spits into his boss’s 
coffee. The disgust one feels when witnessing such an act may draw one’s attention to 
the negative consequences, including risk of illness and uncleanliness. But we lack 
compelling empirical evidence that disgust alone changes one’s mind—making one think, 
regardless of highlighting relevant information, that an action is now wrong or 
substantially worse. Compare: My smartphone might inform me by searching the Internet 
that sharing needles spreads disease. But neither my iPhone nor Google are integral to the 
process of categorizing actions as moral or immoral.  
Rhetorical appeals to repugnance thus have considerable limitations. First, 
making one’s audience feel revolted about an action or policy is unlikely to change their 
moral opinion about it. After all, a strong disgust response to a moral violation typically 
follows only if one already deems it a moral violation in the first place. Second, while 
disgust may sometimes slightly amplify one’s moral condemnation, it’s not so powerful 
that it will likely change many minds. Disgust thus appears to have much less rhetorical 
capital than its proponents have accorded it. 
Of course, revulsion can motivate a change in moral judgment if we speak loosely. 
One might use “revulsion” to refer to a negative moral attitude, for example, especially 
regarding acts so heinous as to repel upon contemplation. But then it’s trivially true that 
so-called “revulsion” can effect a change in moral belief. Loose usage of “disgust” can 
also involve reference to a different emotion. There is some evidence that when a moral 
violation isn’t independently disgusting the term “disgust” is often used merely to express 
anger (Nabi 2002; Gutierrez et al. 2012; Herz & Hinds 2013). Not long ago in the UK, a 
distinguished writer called a policy “disgusting” that would ban prisoners from receiving 
books (quoted in Flood 2014). The policy may be despicable and infuriating, but 
disgusting?  
Appeals to disgust in moral and political discourse, however, are often literal. As 
Kekes puts it, to consider an action “sickening is not a metaphor” (1998, 101). At the very 
least, the rhetorical appeals of interest here deliberately evoke those visceral feelings so 
characteristic of being grossed out, even if faint. In what follows, we’ll consider four 
common examples from both sides of the political spectrum: attempts to motivate 
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condemnation of homosexuality, abortion, cruelty to animals, and environmental 
pollution.  
 
3.1 Conservative Rhetoric 
 
Those on the political right tend to oppose the lifestyles of those who are lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, or transgender, and the language of disgust is common in the corresponding 
rhetoric. Consider one such instance from Thabiti Anyabwile, the pastor of a church in 
Washington, DC. Anyabwile (2013) wrote a piece on the Christian website, The Gospel 
Coalition, in which he argued for the importance of describing homosexual acts 
graphically in public discourse in order to engage one’s “gag” reflex: “That reflex 
triggered by an accurate description of homosexual behavior will be the beginning of the 
recovery of moral sense and sensibility when it comes to the so-called ‘gay marriage’ 
debate.”  
Similar appeals to disgust cropped up in 2015 when residents of the largest city 
in Texas were tasked with voting on the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance. If passed, 
Proposition 1 would have simply outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. But opponents worried that, in order to avoid 
discriminating against transgender people, businesses would be required to allow anyone 
to use the men’s or women’s bathrooms if they so desired. A radio advertisement 
opposing the ordinance, produced by the Campaign for Houston, had a young woman 
proclaim: “This ordinance will allow men to freely go into women’s bathrooms, locker 
rooms and showers. That is filthy, that is disgusting, and that is unsafe” (quoted in 
Driessen 2015). 
Rhetorical appeals to disgust are also common among conservatives who 
vehemently oppose abortion in a wide range of cases, if not all of them. Since they see it 
as the murder of an innocent person, conservatives aim to convince as many people to 
share their opposition to the practice. One tactic, used in America at least, is to display 
gruesome images of aborted fetuses at various stages of development. Perhaps the goal is 
merely to acquaint onlookers with a vivid depiction of the effects of abortion, not to 
disgust. There are some merits to moral persuasion by images, at least because they can 
make vivid morally relevant facts that we’d otherwise overlook or underappreciate 
(McGrath 2011). Nevertheless, the pictures used do typically evoke disgust. The activists 
could simply present the facts in a less arresting manner, but they believe that approach 
would have less rhetorical force. One leading anti-abortion activist reports of such 
images: “We have lots of anecdotal evidence that they’re very effective” (quoted in 
Graham 2015).  
However, the role of disgust in moral judgment suggests otherwise. Those already 
opposed to abortion, for example, will likely find images of aborted fetuses morally 
horrific and their moral condemnation will be reinforced. Those who are already “pro-
choice” will also tend to find the images repellant, but in no way morally problematic. 
The same goes for sexual morality: disgust per se will only typically resonate with those 
who already find the practice or its practitioners morally questionable. If anything, disgust 
alone will only slightly amplify one’s existing moral judgment, not change one’s mind. 
One recent study directly supports this prediction. Daniel Wisneski and Linda 
Skitka (2017) examined whether attitudes toward legalized abortion would be affected 
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by images of aborted fetuses rather than unrelated disgusting images (e.g. of animal abuse 
or feces). The researchers apparently found that, while participants’ moral judgments 
weren’t affected by the abortion-related images (reported in the Supplementary 
Materials), their moral convictions were slightly amplified. “Moral conviction” is the 
researchers’ term for roughly how deeply you hold your moral judgment—how much 
your position on abortion is “a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions” and 
“deeply connected to beliefs about fundamental questions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’” (143).  
Importantly for our purposes, the disgusting images of aborted fetuses increased 
moral conviction on both sides of the dispute. Opponents and proponents of legalized 
abortion came to hold their positions more deeply or with greater conviction when they 
recently saw images of aborted fetuses, compared to those in the control groups who saw 
disgusting images but ones that were not related to the topic of abortion. So, contrary to 
prominent abortion activists, this study suggests that their visual media of choice further 
entrenches existing opinions on both sides, leading to greater polarization not persuasion. 
What about agnostics or those on the fence? Perhaps activists merely aim to 
convince this group with vivid depictions of mangled fetuses. Here is where the science 
can help most. Given that disgust alone does not substantially influence moral judgment, 
it’s unlikely to be effective even with undecided targets. Certainly repulsive images may 
tip the scales for some, but we have reason to doubt they are “very effective” or possess 
“powerful rhetorical capital.”  
 
3.2 Liberal Rhetoric 
 
Now consider leftist or liberal appeals to disgust in opposition to practices like animal 
experimentation or factory farming. Activists have famously broken into researchers’ 
laboratories to acquire videos revealing cruelty toward animals. Others have gone 
undercover and captured footage of the poor treatment of many animals in factory farms. 
In some U.S. states, covertly capturing such disturbing treatment and conditions on tape 
is now illegal, due to so-called “ag-gag” bills (Oppel 2013). Importantly for our purposes, 
such videos don’t just depict cruelty, but also repulsive conditions and treatment, such as 
the bloody battering of helpless livestock, diseased and disfigured animals with open 
wounds, rotting carcasses left in communal pens, and the burning of flesh with hot irons 
and caustic chemicals. In one sixty-second video on factory farming, from the People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the prevalence of blood, guts, manure, and other bodily 
fluids is conspicuous. Similarly, animal rights activists sometimes pour red paint on 
people wearing fur coats, often famous individuals (particularly Joan Rivers). The paint 
is meant to look like blood, which may provoke some revulsion among spectators. 
 We can also consider environmentalist campaigns to reduce pollution and avert 
the disasters of climate change. Disgust is fitting for moral issues involving pollution of 
the body or mind, but also the environment. Some researchers even believe that the 
science of moral judgment can harness disgust to motivate conservation efforts. Rottman, 
Keleman, and Young write that “invoking purity-based concerns and closely associated 
feelings of disgust… can be an effective method for increasing moral concern for the 
environment” (2015, 138). Such tactics are already in use. To raise awareness about 
polluting the ocean with plastic, one environmentalist poster depicts a sushi roll tightly 
wrapped in pieces of plastic grocery bags, instead of seaweed, with what looks like part 
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of a condom in the center of the roll, instead of fish. The tagline reads: “What goes in the 
ocean goes in you.”  
 There is some evidence that framing environmental issues in terms of impurity 
can increase pro-environment attitudes among conservatives (Feinberg & Willer 2013). 
Liberal and conservative participants were randomly assigned to read either a non-
environmental message, a pro-environmental message framed in terms of (and depicting) 
pollution and impurity, or a pro-environmental message framed in terms of (and 
depicting) harm and destruction. While liberals reported relatively high pro-
environmental attitudes regardless of the type of message, such attitudes increased among 
conservatives who read the purity message. However, the researchers manipulated 
relevant information about moral concerns of purity or degradation, not incidental 
disgust. Perhaps disgust played a role, but only when it was integrated with information 
that conservatives took to be particularly relevant (cf. Wisneski & Skitka 2017). 
So this experiment doesn’t exactly provide powerful evidence that feeling disgust 
alone increases moral support for environmental protection among conservatives. Instead, 
we have evidence that conservatives are more inclined to think that the environment needs 
protection after reading about it being filled with pollution and impurity rather than being 
harmed or destroyed. These findings can be explained cognitively by research which 
suggests that conservatives more strongly value purity, sanctity, and avoiding degradation 
(e.g. Graham et al. 2013). When threats to such values are more salient, conservatives 
become more aware of it. 
 
3.3 Rhetorical Limits 
 
In the end, whether one is advocating for animal rights or environmental protection, we 
have little reason to think disgust will be effective at changing people’s minds. Much like 
pro-choicers, those who believe animals lack anything close to moral rights may be 
disgusted by their conditions in laboratories or factory farms, but this alone is unlikely to 
significantly affect the relevant moral beliefs. Animal rights activists and their allies may 
be especially disgusted and connect this response to their moral condemnation of the 
treatment of animals. However, like conservative responses to aborted fetuses or to 
transgender people in bathrooms, we’re at best only witnessing the power of disgust to 
slightly amplify one’s existing moral beliefs.  
Now, suppose one’s goal is merely to entrench people’s moral beliefs on one or 
both sides of an issue. Perhaps one is merely trying to rally the base or earn partisan votes. 
As a merely descriptive matter, disgust might be somewhat effective at achieving this 
aim. However, since appeals to disgust can themselves be rather unappealing, they incur 
a special risk of backfire. Consider again the “pro-life” signs depicting aborted fetuses. 
These are notoriously offensive to many people, and not just liberals who already identify 
as “pro-choice.” Many people undecided about the morality of abortion can easily be 
turned off by “pro-life” movements that use horrific imagery. It’s thus unsurprising that 
we find experimental evidence that images of aborted fetuses tend to entrench moral 
convictions on both sides of the debate (again, see Wisneski & Skitka 2017).  
Better ways of drawing attention to one’s cause will likely tap emotions that more 
powerfully influence moral judgment and that are less likely to backfire. Candidates 
include anger toward gratuitous harm and rights-violations, fear of dystopian futures, and 
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shame toward the dishonorable actions and policies of one’s group (Appiah 2010; Jacquet 
2015). Some activists have even capitalized on viewers’ sexual attraction to celebrities as 
a way of drawing attention to animal rights. However, like incidental disgust, these 
emotions might be utterly impotent if they aren’t an appropriate response to morally 
relevant information, such as drawing one’s attention to mistreatment or unfairness. 
 
 
4. Changing Behavior? 
 
The science of moral judgment suggests that appeals to repugnance are unlikely to change 
someone’s mind. Yet they are so common in politics. As Martha Nussbaum (2004) has 
pointed out, the history of political rhetoric and propaganda is rife with attempts to portray 
marginalized groups as disgusting—particularly women, Jews, homosexuals, and 
“untouchables.” While such propaganda is often meant to convince others to join 
opposition to a policy or practice, such effects can gain traction simply by amplifying 
existing negative attitudes and motivating withdraw and exclusion behavior that is 
unmediated by one’s moral beliefs. This is compatible with disgust failing to possess the 
rhetorical capital that conservatives and liberals alike tend to accord it. If disgust is 
pernicious, it’s due to the emotion’s slight power to polarize existing divisions and 
motivate action without a change in moral belief. So, while repugnant rhetoric may be 
futile when it comes to changing minds, the strategy might be useful for purely 
motivational tactics, such as rallying one’s moral or political allies.  
Some appeals to disgust may have this effect unwittingly. During his 2016 
presidential bid, Donald Trump commented on Hilary Clinton taking an especially long 
time to use the bathroom during a debate. Trump said the scenario was “too disgusting” 
to discuss (Goldfarb 2015). The remark is reminiscent of another that Trump made 
months earlier during his feud with Fox News anchor Megyn Kelly in which he said: 
“You could see there was blood coming out of her eyes, blood coming out of her… 
wherever” (Rucker 2015). It’s notable that Trump’s repeated appeals to disgust may have 
been merely to rally the Republican base (especially when at the time he was preparing 
for the primary, not general, election). Similarly, Greenberg’s piece on abortion appeared 
primarily in newspapers in the Southern states, although this was probably unintentional, 
as more liberal outlets are simply unlikely to publish it. Either way, the effect will be of 
mobilizing those already vehemently opposed to abortion, not of changing the opinions 
of the undecided or of those who already support a woman’s right to choose. 
 One might ask, however: Why would disgust rally one’s supporters if it doesn’t 
substantially influence moral judgment? One answer lies in our ability to attribute 
feelings to an incorrect source (Schachter & Singer 1962). If you already hold a negative 
moral judgment, disgust can indeed amplify it by causing you to unconsciously 
misattribute the true source of disgust (such as a bloody limb) to a morally relevant factor 
(such as gratuitous suffering). Revulsion can amplify moral judgments in this way but 
only indirectly. We’re tacitly aware that stronger emotional reactions tend to follow a 
harsher moral judgment and are thus evidence of its severity, much like when we 
automatically take more smoke as evidence of a larger fire (for further discussion, see 
May 2018).  
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Another explanation lies in the motivational, not cognitive, effects of disgust. So 
far we have focused on how this emotion affects one’s beliefs, since rhetoric is chiefly 
meant to convince. Emotions, however, are commonly thought to feature action 
tendencies: rapid effects on motivation and behavior (but see Seligman et al. 2016: ch. 
8). Consider not only disgust but other emotions, such as anger and fear. Anger seems to 
motivate attack, particularly retaliation in response to poor treatment or perceived 
injustice, while fear motivates withdraw and flight from a perceived danger (Haidt 2003). 
Disgust motivates withdraw and expulsion from the body with the characteristic “gape 
face,” which typically involves opening of the mouth and sometimes protrusion of the 
tongue (Kelly 2011). When directed at the activities of certain people or groups, this 
emotion can easily motivate withdraw from the group and its members. When disgust-
based rhetoric or propaganda are then disseminated widely, gaining a large audience, it 
may lead a sizeable number of people to increase their exclusion of, or withdraw from, 
the already denounced individual or group (compare Nussbaum 2004; Kelly 2011). Thus, 
disgust may be able to motivate action without being heavily mediated by an influence 
on one’s moral beliefs.   
If this is right, the only significant role for the moral psychology of disgust may 
be in policy-making. The emotion may nudge populations away from truly repugnant 
people or foul behavior. Compare public health problems. When we work to decrease 
rates of diabetes, cancer, infant mortality, and other large-scale health problems, we pay 
close attention to even slight contributors. Increasing taxes on cigarettes won’t discourage 
everyone from smoking, because cost is only one among many factors and because it’s 
effect on the problem is slight. Nevertheless, taxes on cigarettes can play an important 
role in sound policies to address problems among a massive population.  
However, again there is a special limit with repugnance: the risk of backfire 
(§3.3). Disgust is indeed a powerful emotion that motivates retreat from its object. In the 
case of propaganda, the emotion can easily be directed toward both the messenger and 
their message. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A sizeable amount of scientific evidence suggests that stirring up feelings of disgust in 
an audience is unlikely to substantially influence their moral beliefs. By itself disgust 
hardly influences moral judgment; it at best sometimes slightly amplifies one’s existing 
condemnation. Moreover, when there is a connection between one’s moral beliefs and 
one’s reaction of disgust, the emotion is typically a consequence of the belief that one has 
already formed, not a cause. 
Repugnant rhetoric and propaganda are thus unlikely to convince one’s opponents 
or even those on the fence. Such tactics would be much more powerful if disgust alone 
substantially influenced moral judgment. Instead, this approach is liable to merely rally 
one’s existing allies, polarize opinions in the discourse, and discourage critical reflection 
on one’s beliefs. Repugnant propaganda can sometimes draw attention to good causes, 
but there is great risk of backfire in which one’s captive audience becomes repelled by 
the activists and their message. Perhaps such pernicious effects are more likely to occur 
for political conservatives, since they are more easily disgusted than liberals (Inbar et al. 
2012). Even so, we’re all afflicted to some degree, jeopardizing the entire discourse. 
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Of course, disgust can certainly sometimes influence moral judgment, perhaps 
sometimes rather substantially. However, in such cases it’s unlikely to be incidental but 
rather integral (to borrow a term from Cameron et al. 2013). That is, disgust can influence 
one’s moral thinking when it draws one’s attention to morally relevant information, in 
which case the emotion isn’t doing the heavy lifting. Depictions of open wounds and 
mangled body parts, for example, can sometimes provoke anger at cruelty or injustice, 
but the disgusting aspects of such scenes are not necessarily integral to the relevant moral 
judgment. Indeed, our best scientific evidence suggests that core disgust does not play an 
important role in ordinary moral cognition. Disgust may ultimately be more useless than 
it is pernicious. 
While I think we should be dubious of disgust’s power to convince, none of this 
is to say that appealing to this emotion can’t garner quick and powerful motivational and 
behavioral responses. But change in moral judgment—indeed moral progress—is slow 
and follows from vivid comprehension of morally relevant information (May 2018). A 
better approach, for example, grounded in the science of moral judgment, may be to 
inform others of the relevant facts, point out inconsistencies in their reasoning, and draw 
analogies that encourage treating like cases alike (see Campbell and Kumar 2012). 
Perhaps the limits of disgust should be unsurprising, for it is rather different from 
emotions like anger, compassion, and shame. These emotions, unlike disgust, seem to be 
intimately tied to moral concepts and beliefs, whereas disgust is more easily treated as 
“pre-normative” (a phrase borrowed from Landy & Goodwin 2015). Orators may do 
better to evoke these other emotional reactions in their audience. However, a similar 
difficulty likely remains, since one may be unlikely to feel these emotions without already 
holding the relevant beliefs.  
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